Perception Management

1. 'Preparation
• Deception needs a well defined aim and to be directed at a target.
• Needs detailed knowledge of the target.
• Plan the entire scheme and consider the target's reaction to it.
• Also plan the groundwork for the deception.'

2. 'Credibility
• Deception must never seem incongruous or illogical. It must be feasible.
• It should be in line with what the target expects to happen.'

3. 'Multi-Channel Support
• All the false information on all channels must support the deception.
• Channels must also conform to each other.
• Positive to draw target's attention, negative to repel attention.'

4. 'Centralised Control
• Deception schemes should be centrally controlled to avoid confusion.
• All schemes must be centrally controlled and the level of control (headquarters) determined by the
number of units involved in the plan.'

5. 'Security
• Detailed knowledge of deception limited to the smallest number of people. ·
• Knowledge on a need to know basis.'

6. 'Flexibility
• Deception plan should be flexible to take advantage of unforseen developments or to abandon it
without revealing the aims of the deception plan.'

7. 'Coordination
• Individuals need to know what they must do and when.'

There is a powerful commercial imperative to ensure that the emerging system of cyberspace
networks operates with increased efficiency so that inventories of any data
and/or material commodity can be exploited with less need for the maintenance of
large inventories that compensate for uncertainties about supply and demand. This
substitution of “efficiency for mass” in many cases unfortunately leads to new types
of vulnerabilities to attack—especially in the early (and during any other) dynamic
stages of a network’s evolution (more the rule than the exception in much of cyberspace).
This rapidly evolving phenomenon provides a malevolent and competent
cyberspace actor with potential near-speed-of-light access to a wide range of national
“strategic targets” within the GII.

In this situation, many advanced and interconnected networks can be subjected to
attack by a range of entities including skilled individuals; actors that are not states,
such as transnational criminal organizations; and states with a well-trained cadre of
“cyberspace warriors.” The key ingredients are access and mastery over, for example,
a particular data file, data management system, or flow control system—in a
context where key information infrastructure databases and management and control
systems are increasingly interconnected.

[...]

Further, there is the possibility that the “facts” of an event can be powerfully
manipulated via text, audio, and video (such as the use of advanced video techniques
to manipulate images). In particular, such techniques may allow a wide variety of actors
to conduct sophisticated perception management or public diplomacy campaigns
designed to undermine domestic support for a particular course of action
taken by the USG. These kinds of campaigns pose problems not only for the government
but also for the media as an institution in their search for “accurate coverage.”

[...]

Targets for collection of intelligence will clearly be far more difficult to identify. The
classical geostrategic approach of focusing on specific nation-states as “threats”
has become obsolescent. Intelligence collection targets will now include
nongovernmental organizations, TCOs, and actors that are not nation-states. The
weight and significance of a particular threat will depend upon an assessment of
both the capability of potential cyberspace attackers, their intentions, and the vulnerability
of a particular target set.